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Abstract  
This paper explores the extent and forms of black economic empowerment (BEE) in the 
South African agricultural sector through a case study of the wine industry in the Western 
Cape. Compared to the mining and fisheries sectors, the progress of BEE in the agricultural 
sector is still in the early stage. However, various forms of black entry into the wine industry, 
not limited to BEE deals by large corporations, began to emerge, especially since the 
enactment of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE Act), Act 53 of 
2003. This paper identifies two types of BEE wineries as unique forms of black entry into the 
wine industry and investigates in detail their features, backgrounds and challenges by 
referring to several prominent examples of each type of BEE winery. 
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Introduction 
 
Black1 economic empowerment (BEE) is one of the key items on the social and political 
agenda in democratic South Africa. BEE is the most advanced in such sectors as mining, fishing 
and state-owned enterprises, where the government can impose pressure on individual 
companies through policy instruments such as the granting of prospecting and mining rights and 
the allocation of fishing quotas (Cargill 2010, Ponte and van Sittert 2007, Ponte et al. 2007, 
Southall 2007). In contrast, the progress of BEE in the agricultural sector is still in the early 
stage. The purpose of this paper is to discuss to what extent and in what form the entry of black 
people is being achieved in the agricultural sector, where the regulatory power of the 
government is still relatively weak, through a case study of the wine industry in the Western 
Cape.  
 
Even in the sectors and industries where the government has strong regulatory power, it has 
been pointed out that the outcome of the BEE policy is mixed and varies in each sector. For 
example, Ponte and van Sittert (2007) have revealed that the regulatory power of the 
government alone cannot realize meaningful BEE in industrial fishery. On the other hand, while 
BEE is most advanced in the mining sector, it has been noted that there are problems of 
corruption and abuse of power by politicians and officials in the Department of Mineral 
Resources when granting prospecting rights (Cargill 2010: 95-102, Marais 2011: 141-144). 
Thus, the degree and practices of BEE differ widely among the sectors and industries. It is 
necessary to analyse the unique characteristics of each industry, and not least, the dynamic 
interactions among principal actors. Thus, this paper will discuss both the BEE policy in the 
agricultural sector and the specific measures introduced in the wine industry to promote black 
entry and empowerment.  
 
Currently, the agricultural sector accounts for 2.4% (2010) of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
of South Africa. It has nearly halved since 1990 (4.6%) when political transition began. 
However, the gross added value of agricultural products has increased significantly in recent 
years, to 129.5 billion rand (2009/10) from 21.9 billion rand (1990/91) (DAFF 2012: 77-78). In 
particular, the exports of fruits and vegetables for the European market have grown since 
democratization and liberalization of the agricultural market in the late 1990s. Wine exports 
have also increased rapidly and have become the leading agricultural product of the country. 
The main wine export destinations are European countries including the United Kingdom, 
                                                   
1 Based on the definition of the BEE policy, this paper employs “black” as a general term referring 
to all three groups classified as “other than white” in the apartheid racial registration, i.e. “coloured”, 
“African” and “Asiatic (Indian)”. 
2 
 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. While South Africa has the twelfth largest 
area under vine in the world, it produces the eighth largest volume of wine, amounting to 3.6% 
of total wine production in the world (SAWIS 2012: 27, 34).2 The wine industry is a key 
industry in the Western Cape, where most wine farms and cellars are situated. Including wine 
tourism, the industry employed 8.8% of the total employees in the province in 2008 
(Conningarth Economists 2009: 30). 
 
White farmers have historically dominated the commercial farming sector in South Africa. 
Under apartheid, the prospect for black producers to engage in commercial farming was 
severely restricted. The wine industry was a typical example of white domination in commercial 
agriculture. With the start of the political transition in 1990, racial restrictions on land 
ownership were eliminated, and land reform was introduced after the birth of the administration 
led by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994. However, land reform has failed to meet 
the initial target of transferring 30% of land owned by white famers to black people, and 
moreover, it has achieved little in terms of the development of black farmers. Various reasons 
for this have been pointed out, including insufficient post-settlement support, lack of experience, 
technology and competence among farmers who acquire land, and frequent conflicts among 
land reform beneficiaries over the issue of how to use land (Sato 2009, James 2007, CDE 2005, 
Hall ed. 2009).  
 
As the limitations of land reform became evident, researchers began to look at initiatives by 
industry organizations to promote black farmers (CDE 2008, Kleinbooi 2009). Two things need 
to be understood as the background of the increased intervention from the agricultural industry 
led by white farmers. The first is the mounting fear among white farmers. They are worried that 
a growing discontent among rural residents due to lack of progress in land reform might be 
converted to political populism, which in turn could bring about a Zimbabwe-style land reform 
(Greenberg 2006). The second is the progress of the BEE policy. With the consolidation of 
political power by the ANC especially under the Mbeki Administration, the content of BEE 
policy became clearer. Amid the mounting pressures from the government to implement BEE, 
the agricultural industry and individual farmers began their own initiatives to define the scope 
of BEE in their own terms. 
 
Existing literature on the BEE policy and practices in the wine industry can be divided into two 
groups. The first group, written by sociologists and political scientists, mainly looks at specific 
                                                   
2 The area under vine reached 100,568 ha in 2011 with a total wine production of 831.2 million 
litres (SAWIS 2012: 5, 8). Wine is produced in the Western Cape, the Northern Cape and part of the 
Free State provinces. 
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case studies or focuses on particular aspects of transformation. Hamman and Ewert (1999) 
examine early cases of land reform in the wine industry. Williams (2005) provides a detailed 
analysis of the transformation process of the Ko-operatieve Wijnbouwers Vereniging van 
Zuid-Afrika Beperkt (KWV: South African Wine Farmers’ Cooperative) which occupies a 
central position in the historical development of the South African wine industry. Kruger (2008) 
and McEwan and Bek (2009) discuss the relationship between ethical trade such as fair trade 
and BEE. Du Toit et al. (2008) critically examine the state of overall transformation in the wine 
industry. The second group looks at the changes brought about by liberalization of the wine 
market. Mainly written by agricultural economists, these studies argue that significant 
qualitative change has occurred in the South African wine industry since exports of wine soared 
after liberalization (Sandrey and Vink 2008, Ponte and Ewert 2007, Vink et al. 2004). 
 
Market liberalization and BEE are two important keywords for understanding the South African 
wine industry after democratization, but many of the previous studies have so far focused on 
one aspect or the other, but not both. There is little research that explicitly examines the 
relationship between the changes after liberalization and the forms of black entry into the wine 
industry.3 Against such background, this paper attempts to explore to what extent and in what 
way the changes brought about by market liberalization have expanded or narrowed the 
conditions of and the prospect for black entry and empowerment in the South African wine 
industry. I will also examine the relevance of policy (i.e., land reform, BEE) in facilitating black 
entry into the wine industry and highlight the challenges facing BEE. 
 
This paper consists of three sections. The first section discusses the transformation of the wine 
industry after democratization and market liberalization and explores its implications for new 
black entrants into the industry. The second section deals with policies and measures introduced 
by the industry organizations to facilitate black entry into the wine industry and is divided into 
two phases: the first phase is centred on the activities of the South African Wine Industry Trust 
(SAWIT) and the second phase is about the efforts by the wine industry to comply with the 
government’s BEE policy. The third section discusses the two unique forms of black entry into 
the wine industry in detail, questioning the meaning of empowerment and highlighting the 
challenges that each form of entry poses. In conclusion, I will summarize the findings of this 
paper and shed light on the prospects and challenges of BEE. 
 
                                                   
3 As an exception, Ewert and Du Toit (2005) discuss the effects of intensifying international 
competition after liberalization on the condition of farmworkers in the Western Cape. They argue 
that, together with labour legislation reform, market liberalization accelerated the process of dividing 
farmworkers into a small number of core regular workers and the majority of seasonal workers. 
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The South African Wine Industry after Democratization 
 
Transformation of the Wine Industry 
It is relatively new that South African wine has been recognized as a fine export commodity. 
Except for the period during the British colonial era,4 most of the wine produced in South 
Africa was consumed domestically. The wine production, which was started by European 
settlers in the mid-seventeenth century,5 was heavily regulated by the KWV (wine farmers’ 
cooperative) during most of the twentieth century. KWV regulated the size of vine cultivation, 
wine production, domestic distribution and exports (Williams et al. 1998: 67-69). The purpose 
of the formation of KWV in the early twentieth century was to ensure a fair price for grape 
producers. However, the institutional mechanism by which KWV guaranteed minimum prices 
to grape producers, who were paid by the amount of grapes they produced, lacked incentive for 
the producers to improve the quality of their product. As a result, the wine industry produced a 
large quantity of wine of inferior quality mainly for the domestic market. Farms and cellars 
which produced good table wine were confined to a small number of estates (where the farmers 
cultivated grapes, made wine and bottled it on the estate) in the Constantia and Stellenbosch 
regions. The widespread international boycott of South African products in support of the 
growing anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s also hampered wine export (Vink et al. 2004: 
232, 236, Ewert and Du Toit 2005: 318). 
 
KWV’s control over the various aspects of grape cultivation and wine production was gradually 
removed, and in 1997, the marketing of wine was liberalized.6 Since then, both the area under 
grape cultivation and the wine production have increased year by year. The area under vine 
increased from 83,717 hectares in 1993 to 100,568 ha in 2011. Wine production increased from 
395.03 million litres in 1993 to 831.2 million litres in 2011 (SAWIS 2012: 5, 8; 2005: 9, 14). At 
the same time, wine export surged thanks to the termination of the international boycott of the 
South African products. The proportion of exports to total production of wine was just 6.2% in 
1993. By 2000, it had increased to 26% of total production, and in 2008 the export amounted to 
53.9%, exceeding domestic sales (SAWIS 2011: 26; 2005: 24). In contrast, growth in the 
                                                   
4 Wine was an important export commodity from the Cape Colony to England from late eighteenth 
century to the first half of the nineteenth century, before England concluded the trade agreement with 
France in 1860. 
5 The origin of wine production dates back to when the Cape Colony was under the reign of the 
Dutch East India Company. Wine production expanded when the Huguenots settled there from 
France in the second half of the seventeenth century (Kench et al. 1983, Vink et al. 2004: 229). 
6 The quota system involving the acreage of grape production was abolished in 1992 (Williams et al. 
1998: 73, Van der Merwe 2000: 13). The price guarantee system for wine was removed in 1995 
(Williams 2005: 482), and the monopoly on wine exports by KWV was reviewed in 1997 (Ewert 
and Du Toit 2005: 318). 
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domestic sale of wine was slow throughout the 1990s, and it shifted to a decrease in 2003 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
 
One of the reasons for the massive growth of South African wine exports during this period lay 
in its novelty. South African wine was “new” to the market. In particular, thanks to the 
“Mandela magic”, South Africa attracted enormous interest from the international community 
during the period immediately after democratization.7 It was also fortunate for South Africa 
that the wine market in the Nordic countries and the UK expanded and the sales of “New World” 
wine grew during the same period (Anderson ed. 2004). Ponte and Ewert (2007: 59) note that 
the inferior quality of South African wine was hidden during this early period thanks to its 
novelty. This situation did not endure, however. Various efforts were made to improve the 
quality of the wine in order to benefit from the boom in exports. As a result, it is said that wine 
production in South Africa has been fundamentally changed in the following three aspects.  
 
Firstly, the production of table wine (wine not used for distilling liquor or brandy) increased. In 
particular, the production of red wine grew by leaps and bounds due to high international 
                                                   
7 Interview with Mr. Henry Petersen, Manager of BEE Programmes and Master Mentorship, Wine 
Industry Development Association (WIDA), 17 September 2010, Paarl. 
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Source: SAWIS [2005; 2010; 2012]. 
Note: Not all wine produced in a given year is sold or exported.  
Thus, domestic sales + exports ≠ production. 
Figure 1 Wine Production, Domestic Sales and Exports 
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demand for it as well as the high price it commanded.8  
 
Secondly, the types of grape under cultivation shifted from high-yield to high-value varietals, 
and the growing area of the latter expanded. While the cultivated area of the six noble varietals 
(Cabernet Sauvignon, Shiraz, Pinotage, Merlot, Sauvignon Blanc, Chardonnay) was only 6.5% 
of all the vineyards in 1980, it increased to 19% of the vineyards and 42.5% of new plantings in 
1995 (Vink et al. 2004: 237). The proportion of noble varietals had risen to 52.9% of the 
vineyards as of 2011 (SAWIS 2012: 11). 
 
Thirdly, producer structure in the industry has changed. Whereas both grape growing area and 
the amount of wine production were on the rise starting in the mid-1990s, grape producers 
decreased by more than 20%, to 3,527 entities in 2011 from 4,646 entities in 1996 (Table 1). 
Small-scale growers who produce less than 100 tons per year decreased to 1,461 entities in 2011 
from 2,173 entities in 2002, while large-scale growers who produce in excess of 1,000 tons per 
year increased to 336 entities (2011) from 224 entities (2002). This means that grape production 
has become increasingly concentrated among large-scale growers, while small-scale growers 
have continued to leave the land. 
 
Table 1 Number of Grape Producers Per Production Category 
Year/Tons 1996 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1-100 n.a. 2,173 2,084 1,648 1,717 1,544 1,536 1,542 1,461 
>100-500 n.a. 1,545 1,582 1,421 1,475 1,423 1,314 1,304 1,273 
>500-1,000 n.a. 404 453 432 482 498 462 415 457 
>1,000-5,000 n.a. 223 238 265 318 367 348 329 329 
>5,000-10,000 n.a. 1 3 5 7 7 7 6 7 
Total 4,646 4,346 4,360 3,771 3,999 3,839 3,667 3,596 3,527 
Source: SAWIS [2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012], SAWIC [2007], Vink et al. [2004], Williams 
[2005], Ponte and Ewert [2007]. 
 
 
It seems that the opposite change has happened among the cellars (Table 2). The total number of 
cellars increased to 582 in 2011 from 295 in 1996. In particular, private cellars which operate on 
a relatively small scale increased rapidly. On the other hand, producer cellars operated by 
                                                   
8 In 1997, 85% of the wine produced in South Africa was white wine. Its ratio was reduced to 79% 
in 2000 and 61% in 2005. However, the proportion of white wine increased again to 65% in 2011 
(SAWIS 2012: 14; 2005: 14). 
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cooperatives decreased to 52 cellars in 2011 from 69 cellars in 1996. In this regard, Williams 
(2005: 477) points out that many cooperative cellars have merged or converted into private 
companies since 1998 in order to increase their flexibility in procuring grapes and to develop a 
market strategy and wine brand. 
 
Table 2 Number of Wine Cellars Which Crush Grapes 
Year 1996 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Producer Cellars 69 66 65 66 59 58 57 54 52 
Private Wine Cellars 218 349 495 477 481 504 524 493 505 
Producing Wholesalers 8 13 21 18 20 23 23 26 25 
Total 295 428 581 561 560 585 604 573 582 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
 
 
As for the wine merchants (traders who purchase bulk wine9) including producer-wholesalers, 
there was an increase in new entrants, in particular exporters, until the global financial crisis of 
2008 (Table 3). On the other hand, mergers of existing large-scale enterprises took place once 
again. Stellenbosch Farmers Winery (SFW) and Distillers, which had merged in 1979 but 
separated ten years later, merged again in 2000 to form the Distell Corporation (a listed 
company). Distell is the second largest wholesale liquor company (and the largest wine and 
distilling company) in South Africa (Ewert and Du Toit 2005: 323). 
 
Table 3 Number of Wine Merchants (Bulk Wine Buyers) 
Year 1996 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Wholesalers 46 70 70 n.a. 51 47 61 60 57 
Exporters 10 34 48 n.a. 70 71 41 40 44 
Total 56 104 118 n.a. 121 118 102 100 101 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
Note: Wholesalers include Producing Wholesalers. 
 
 
Implications for Black Entry into the Wine Industry 
What are the implications of these changes in the wine industry since late 1990s for black entry? 
I would argue that at least three issues can be identified. Firstly, as for entry into grape 
                                                   
9 Wine merchants purchase unpackaged wine (bulk wine) from cellars. After blending, maturing and 
bottling it, they sell the wine under their own brand name. Not all of them have cellar facilities of 
their own. 
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production, we must admit that new black grape producers have to start in very difficult 
circumstances. Even small-scale white farmers are no longer able to maintain their production 
under the liberalized market conditions. The South African wine industry as a whole has 
undergone remarkable growth thanks to the increase in exports after liberalization. However, the 
increase in production volume and wine exports did not confer equal benefits on all grape 
producers. In spite of the increase in wine exports, most grape producers’ incomes did not 
improve. According to Conningarth Economists (2009), this was because the price of grapes 
purchased by cellars remained sluggish, while the cost of grape production soared.  
 
Secondly, the increase in private cellars meant that some grape producers were able to invest in 
their farms and construct their own cellars, moving up in the value chain of wine production. 
They are now not only growing grapes but also have created and sold their own wine brand. 
Generally speaking, selling brand wine is considered to realise a higher rate of return than grape 
production. Since the majority of wine exported from South Africa is packaged wine10 (SAWIS 
2012: 26), creation of a popular brand in the international market has become an important 
business strategy for wine producers. The increase in wine merchants (i.e., traders who purchase 
bulk wine) is probably a reflection of the change in the nature of the wine business. Given that 
the initial entry cost of becoming a wine merchant is relatively small, this might be an expedient 
way for black people to enter the wine industry.  
 
Thirdly, it is also important to note that domestic sales stagnated during the period when wine 
exports grew. Historically speaking, domestic wine consumers have mainly been the white 
population, which comprises a mere 10% of the total population in the country. In this sense, the 
domestic wine market is very limited. African people, who account for more than 75% of the 
total population, tend to prefer malt beer or traditional sorghum beer. While the market share of 
malt beer expanded to 46.1% in 2010 from 42.9% in 2000, that of wine decreased to 12.6% 
from 14.0% during the same period (SAWIS 2011: 31; 2010: 30-31).11 This stands in stark 
contrast to the European countries, especially the UK, the main destinations for South African 
wine exports, where rapid expansion in the sale of wine in supermarkets contributed to an 
increase in wine consumption in the 1990s (Anderson ed. 2004). Thus, European countries have 
become important potential markets for new black entrants, who are now forced to participate in 
the global competition over the shelf space in supermarkets.  
 
                                                   
10 Packaged wine refers to wine in a bottle or box that is ready to be put on the shelf. Seventy 
percent of wine exported from South Africa in 2003 was packaged wine (SAWIS 2005: 25). 
11 Sorghum beer, which occupies the second largest market share, has also significantly reduced its 
share over the same period, to 16.6% in 2010 from 24.2% in 2000. 
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Policies and Practices to Facilitate Black Entry into the Wine Industry 
 
Next, I will outline the policy framework and practices to facilitate the entry of black people 
into the wine industry. This is divided in two phases. The first phase refers to activities of the 
trust fund established as a result of the internal transformation process within the wine industry 
in the mid-1990s. The second phase deals with the initiatives and efforts that were started in the 
wine industry in accordance with the development of the overall framework of the BEE policy. 
 
Establishment of the South African Wine Industry Trust (SAWIT) 
As mentioned in the previous section, there existed various regulations and protections for grape 
producers exercised by KWV that formed the centre of the historical development of the South 
African wine industry. KWV controlled the amount of wine in the market and obtained the 
exclusive use of the “surplus grape” thus created. The “surplus grape” was utilized by KWV to 
make fortified wine (i.e., wine with an enhanced alcohol level such as port wine and sherry) and 
distilled brandy and sprits. The sale of these products made from “surplus grape” contributed to 
the formation and expansion of KWV’s assets.12 With the liberalization of the market in the 
1990s, however, KWV lost its central regulatory position in the industry. In response to this 
development, KWV announced in October 1996 its application to the Supreme Court to convert 
itself from a cooperative to a private company. Derek Hanekom, Minister of Land Affairs and 
Agriculture at that time, intervened in the process by imposing several conditions on the 
approval, which included that a new trust fund for the promotion and restructuring of the entire 
wine industry was to be established and that KWV was to contribute to the trust fund a total 
amount of 300 million rand over 10 years. Consequently, KWV became a private company in 
1997, and the South African Wine Industry Trust (SAWIT) was established in Stellenbosch in 
early 1999 (SAWIT 2010a: 16-17, Williams 2005: 482-483, Du Toit et al. 2008: 12-13). 
 
SAWIT set up two substructures called the Wine Industry Business Support Committee 
(BUSCO) and the Wine Industry Development Company (DEVCO). The latter was given a 
mandate to facilitate black entry into the industry and to provide support to projects for 
improvement of living conditions of farmworkers.13 From 1999 to 2009, DEVCO provided 
                                                   
12 It has been said that the exclusive use of surplus grape contributed to the formation of KWV’s 
huge assets which are close to 800 million rand (Vink et al. 2004: 238-239). 
13 BUSCO’s mandate is to conduct research for the development of the wine industry as a whole. 
The organisations which received financial assistance from BUSCO include the following: Wines of 
South Africa (WOSA) which promotes the export of South African wine, Wine Industry Network of 
Expertise and Technology (Winetech) which carries out research on production technology and the 
supply chain, South African Wine Industry Information and System (SAWIS) which collects 
statistical information on the wine industry, and VinPro which represents grape producers and 
provides agricultural extension services (SAWIT 2010a: 8). 
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financial assistance in the following four areas. The first was provision of financial and other 
types of assistance to wineries owned and/or managed by black people, known as BEE wineries. 
In total, 23 BEE wineries received financial and other types of support from SAWIT. The 
second was scholarship and international exchange programmes. SAWIT granted scholarships 
to black students who majored in oenology, viticulture or business administration. It also 
organised short-term study programmes in the winemaking region of Burgundy, France, and the 
United States for black people. The third was provision of funding to NGOs and community 
organisations. In total, 15 such organisations in the Western Cape benefited from the scheme.14 
The fourth was provision of financial assistance to farmworkers’ unions. Thirteen such unions 
in the Western Cape received funding in order to organise workshop and awareness projects 
about labour legislation reform (SAWIT 2010a: 10-14). 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Policy and the Wine Industry Charter 
The enactment of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act, Act No. 53 of 2003 
(BBBEE Act) opened a new era in the process of facilitating participation of black people in the 
mainstream economy. The BBBEE Act is regarded as the second phase of the BEE programme. 
The first phase of BEE was initiated in the early 1990s, just before democratization, by 
white-owned large corporations in the form of selling their subsidiaries to a small number of 
black elites. However, such practices of BEE were heavily criticized by both trade unions and 
black businesspeople. Critics argued that only a small number of black elites benefited from 
BEE projects, while most black people remained poor. Moreover, some of the companies 
owned by black people were forced into bankruptcy in the wake of the Asian economic crisis in 
1998. Faced with the growing criticisms against the outcome of BEE projects, the government 
enacted the BBBEE Act, which aimed to broaden both the practices and beneficiaries of BEE. 
Moreover, the government began to make it clear that it would encourage private companies to 
comply with the scope of BEE, through exercising the provision of licenses and the process of 
public procurement. Thus, BEE became an important compliance matter for companies who 
wished to do business in South Africa (Cargill 2010, Marais 2011: Chap 5, CDE 2007, Ponte et 
al. 2007). 
 
The BBBEE Act introduced a BEE scorecard consisting of seven elements (ownership, 
                                                   
14 The organisations which received financial assistance from SAWIT include the following: Rural 
Development Network (RUDNET) which runs social development projects for farmworkers, 
Dopstop, Centre for Legal Rural Studies, Women on Farms Project (WFP) which advocates the 
improvement of the rights of female farmworkers and runs development projects, Foetal Alcohol 
Syndrome Facts (FASFacts) which advocates the prevention of foetal alcohol syndrome among the 
children of farmworkers, and the Wine Industry Ethical Trade Association (WIETA) which promotes 
fair trade activities (SAWIT 2010a: 13). 
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management control, skills development, preferential procurement, employment equity, 
enterprise development and socio-economic development) in order to measure the degree of 
BEE compliance of a company. The Act also stipulated that, by drafting their own BEE Charter, 
different sectors of the economy and industries would be allowed to determine the specific 
gravity of each element, taking into account the specific needs and conditions of each sector and 
industry. In the agricultural sector, the Ministry of Agriculture drafted the basic framework of 
the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment in the Agricultural Sector (known as 
AgriBEE) through a consultation process with representatives of five commodity sectors (grain, 
cotton, sugar, wine and beef) (SAWIT 2010a: 6, DoA 2004). While it was becoming clear that 
land reform could not achieve the planned targets in both quantity and quality, a new framework 
to facilitate the advancement of black people in the agricultural sector began to materialize in 
the form of AgriBEE. Williams (2005: 479) states that the policy focus of support for black 
farmers in the agricultural sectors “shifted from land reform to BEE” through the BBBEE Act. 
With the implementation of the BBBEE Act, people increasingly began to think of economic 
transformation as synonymous with BEE. 
 
SAWIT and the South African Wine and Brandy Corporation (SAWB) convened a conference 
at the end of 2003 in order to commence discussion about the BEE Charter in the wine industry 
(SAWIT 2010a: 6). SAWB had been formed in the previous year at the initiative of the two 
largest companies in the industry, i.e., the Distell Corporation and KWV. Its Board of Directors 
was comprised of representatives of four components of the industry: grape producers, cellars, 
farmworkers and marketing agents. The latter includes wine merchants, retailers such as liquor 
shops and distributors. At the time when this first conference was held, black ownership in the 
wine industry was less than 1%. In 2006, SAWB was reorganized to the South African Wine 
Industry Council (SAWIC), and SAWIC took over the BEE Charter drafting process (Williams 
2005: 484, Du Toit et al. 2008: 17-18, Ponte and Ewert 2007: 12, footnote 4).15   
 
The Wine Industry Transformation Charter (Wine Charter) was announced by SAWIC in 
November 2007. Thus, it preceded the official publication of the AgriBEE Sector Charter in 
2008 that had been prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture. The Wine Charter adopted the same 
standards as the generic BEE scorecard with slight modifications, in regard to both the weight 
of each of the seven elements in the BEE scorecard and the scope of the charter in terms of the 
size of the business entity. Thus, companies with an annual turnover of more than 35 million 
                                                   
15 An advisory forum was newly established within SAWIC, in which representatives of the 
following organizations participated: Vinpro (grape producers), Wine Cellars of South Africa, 
SAWIT, Black Association of Wine and Spirits Industry (BAWSI), National African Farmers 
Union-Western Cape (NAFU-Western Cape) and RUDNET. The latter three organisations 
represented black farmers, black entrepreneurs and farmworkers. 
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rand must comply with all seven elements in the scorecard, while the companies with an annual 
turnover between 5 and 35 million rand must comply with four elements.16 Companies with an 
annual turnover of less than 5 million rand are exempted from compliance with the BEE 
scorecard (SAWIC 2007: 2, 8, 23-24). 
 
The question arises here with regard to how many farmers or companies will be exempted from 
compliance with the BEE scorecard in the wine industry. The Wine Charter states that “grape 
farmers have to supply 500 – 2,500 tons of grapes in order to obtain [an] annual turnover 
exceeding 5 million rand, assuming that half of their turnover comes from the sale of wine 
grapes.” Therefore, it continues that “about 80% of grape growers” will be exempted from the 
scope of the Wine Charter (SAWIC 2007: 9). In other words, the Wine Charter has excluded the 
possible transfer of individual farms, which form the majority of the white commercial farming 
sector, to black people by exempting business entities with smaller amounts of annual 
turnover.17 On the other hand, it is understood that not only producer (cooperative) cellars and 
producing wholesalers, which produce large amounts of wine every year, but also a small 
number of private cellars whose annual turnover exceeds 5 million rand, are required to comply 
with the BEE scorecard (SAWIC 2007: 18). 
 
The wine industry succeeded in gathering representatives of the four principal actors in the 
industry (grape producers, cellars, farmworkers and marketing agents) at SAWIC and 
announced the BEE Charter. It was thus able to show its eagerness to tackle the challenge of 
transformation and to engage in the political and social demands of BEE. However, in the year 
after the announcement of the Wine Charter, the SAWIC chairperson suddenly resigned. 
Following him, most directors who represented various organisations within the industry also 
resigned. In consequence, SAWIC became dysfunctional, and it became impossible to 
implement the Wine Charter without a responsible organization (SAWIT 2010a: 7). It is not 
known why SAWIC collapsed. According to a former employee of SAWIT who was involved 
in the Wine Charter drafting process, SAWIC became dysfunctional when large players such as 
Distell and KWV withdrew from the process. As for the cause of their withdrawal, he believes it 
is related to the fact that representatives of grape producers (white famers) and farmworkers 
were no longer able to sit together at the negotiating table due to the intensification of conflict 
between them.18 
 
                                                   
16 Each element is treated equally and calculated at 25 points per element. 
17 Due to the same standard, more than 93% of farming units in the commercial agricultural sector 
are exempted from compliance with AgriBEE. 
18 Interview with Dr. Gerhard van Wyk, former employee of SAWIT, 28 September 2011, Somerset 
West. 
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While the implementation of the Wine Charter remains stalled, the circumstances surrounding 
the AgriBEE Charter are progressing.19 The AgriBEE Charter is currently based on Section 12 
of the BBBEE Act, which means that compliance with the Charter is not compulsory. There is 
no penalty even in cases of non-compliance. The Ministry of Agriculture is preparing to convert 
the AgriBEE Charter into the sector code, which is based on Section 9 of the BBBEE Act and 
thus has legally binding status.20 Once the AgriBEE Charter becomes the BEE sector code, the 
Ministry of Agriculture obtains the power to force business entities to comply with the 
scorecard through the granting of licenses such as water rights and regulatory powers 
concerning import and export activities. Therefore, it is not necessary for the wine industry to 
have its own BEE charter. Once this happens, there is a possibility that relatively large cellars 
and producer wholesalers may lose their right to export their wine unless they comply with the 
BEE scorecard. In the Olifants River region in the north-western part of the Western Cape 
Province where water resources are scarce, the provincial Department of Water Affairs has 
already demanded that farmers, who applied for construction of a small dam to irrigate their 
vineyards, involve farmworkers in the management as a condition to obtaining water rights. 
Several such cases are reported in this region (VinPro and Nedcor Foundation 2004: 31-32, 
37-38). It is possible that similar practices will spread to other areas when the AgriBEE Charter 
becomes the sector code.  
 
Moreover, it is conceivable that a chain reaction of BEE might occur within the value chain of 
the wine industry through preferential procurement practices with black producers. According to 
VinPro’s BEE officer, cellars are increasingly asked by retailers such as supermarkets to 
purchase grapes from producers who have complied with the BEE requirements. As a result, 
even small-scale grape producers who are not obliged to comply with the Wine Charter are 
feeling pressure from cellars to comply with the BEE programmes by involving farmworkers in 
the ownership and management structure of their farms. How each producer is trying to comply 
with the BEE requirements will be discussed in the next section.21 Before turning to a detailed 
analysis of farm-level BEE projects, I will briefly note the progress in the compliance with the 
                                                   
19 The wine industry was asked by the AgriBEE Council in 2011 to decide whether it would restore 
the Wine Charter process or take up the AgriBEE Charter without having its own BEE charter (from 
interviews with several members of the AgriBEE Council at the SAWIT conference during 27-28 
September 2011 in Somerset West, South Africa. The conference was entitled “2011 SAWIT 
Conference: Beyond Charter and Scorecard”). 
20 Interview with Mr. Madime Mokoena, Director, BBBEE Charters Compliance, DAFF, 20 
September 2011, Pretoria. After this paper was completed, the AgriBEE Sector Code was finally 
gazetted on 28 December 2012 
(http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=349516&sn=Market
ingweb+detail, accessed on 14 February 2013).  
21 Interview with Mr. Johan Giliomee, Manager, BEE Advisory Service, VinPro, 26 September 2011, 
Paarl. 
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BEE scorecard in the wine industry. 
 
Progress in the Compliance with the BEE Scorecard in the Wine Industry 
In the wine industry where only a few large corporations exist, the number of companies 
obliged to comply with the BEE scorecard is not many.22 However, since the BBBEE Act was 
legislated in 2003, business entities that are subject to the BEE policy began to acquire the BEE 
compliance status by selling shares to a black consortium, even though AgriBEE is still 
voluntary in nature. Instead of the AgriBEE scorecard, they use the BEE generic scorecard 
prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry. Most of the BEE transactions in the South 
African economy as a whole were carried out during 2003 to 2008 (SAIRR 2010: 336). The 
wine industry is no exception to this trend, and the BEE transactions of large corporations in the 
wine industry were concentrated in this period. This means that large corporations in the 
industry took the initiative in converting themselves to BEE compliance companies, without 
waiting for the completion of the AgriBEE policy. 
 
The first BEE transaction in the wine industry took place in 2003. The Boschendal Estate owned 
by the Anglo American Farms, a subsidiary of the Anglo American group, sold part of its shares 
to a group including black investors (Du Toit et al. 2008: 18). In the following year, the BEE 
transaction of KWV, no longer a cooperative but a private company known as KWV Holdings, 
was completed.23 In 2005, the Distell group sold 15% of its subsidiary’s shares to an employees’ 
trust fund, a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) trust, and an investment company owned by 
black women (Wiphold) (Distell 2010: 12). Several cellars also sold shares to black investors 
and investment companies owned by black people (Ponte and Ewert 2007: 13, footnote 5).24 It 
seems that so far the significance of these BEE transactions remains more symbolic than 
practical. Nonetheless, if the chain reaction of BEE as described above continues, these large 
                                                   
22 The Distell group is the only wine-producing company on the list of companies with sales results 
in the top 100 in South Africa in 2009. 
23 Williams (2005) critically examines the process and content of KWV’s BEE deal by discussing 
the price of the stock, the source of the money and the structure of the black consortium. In February 
2011, Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited (HCI), one of the major black investment firms, 
became the largest shareholder in KWV by acquiring a 34.8% stake. HCI was founded in the early 
1990s through the integration of the investment arms of the Southern African Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (SACTWU) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The investment 
department of NUM later withdrew. As of June 2011, three BEE entities (HCI, the investment 
company Withmore 1, and KWV Employees Empowerment Trust Fund) owned the total of a 61.9% 
stake in KWV (KWV 2009, 2010, 2011; HCI 2011; Cargill 2010: 136-148). It is not clear yet how 
having a black investment company as the largest shareholder affects management strategy of KWV. 
Still, one cannot ignore the symbolic significance of the fact that KWV, which had been the centre of 
the domination by white farmers in the wine industry, is now under black control. 
24 Tokyo Sexwale, a prominent ANC politician and famous tycoon who currently serves as the 
Minister of Human Settlements, is known to own several wine farms. 
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corporations can potentially become principal actors in exerting a significant impact on the 
overall transformation of the wine industry. 
 
 
Two Forms of Black Entry into the Wine Industry 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, wineries owned and/or managed by black people are 
known as BEE wineries. In this section, I will discuss two forms of black entry into the wine 
industry by dividing BEE wineries into two groups depending on the ownership of land: (1) 
BEE wineries that own land and (2) BEE wineries that do not own land. By referring to several 
case studies, I will describe in detail the nature and characteristics of each type of BEE winery. 
Most examples discussed in this section have received some sort of assistance from SAWIT. 
They are also listed in a booklet called Ithemba: 15 years of democracy, 350 years of wine 
making (Ithemba means “hope” in isiZulu), published by the Wines of South Africa (WOSA: an 
organization promoting export of South African wine) in order to advertise BEE wineries and 
black winemakers. In this sense, BEE wineries discussed here are relatively well-known in the 
South African wine industry (WOSA 2009). 
 
Landed Entry: Share Equity Schemes and Joint Ventures 
The first type of BEE winery involves land ownership by black people. The earlier cases of this 
form of black entry into the wine industry were the result of land reform. The chief component 
of South African land reform policy, introduced soon after democratization, concerned granting 
a governmental subsidy to black people who wished to purchase land. In the wine and fruit 
industry where the price of land is relatively high and where it takes years before one can realise 
a return from an initial investment, a land reform model called the “share equity scheme” was 
devised and promoted (VinPro and Nedcor Foundation 2004: 8). For instance, the Wine Charter 
proposes the share equity scheme as the most desirable option for land reform in the wine 
industry. According to the Wine Charter, it has two advantages. Firstly, it can give black people 
access to the funding as well as access to the necessary knowledge and experiences in 
viticulture and wine making. Without these, the Charter states that it is highly likely that new 
black businesses in the wine industry will fail. Secondly, it can increase black land ownership, 
while maintaining the existing businesses (SAWIC 2007: 20). 
 
The share equity scheme is a kind of joint venture. Under this scheme, both farmers and 
farmworkers provide capital and manage the farm jointly (Mayson 2003). Capital can be in a 
variety of forms including cash, land, labour, agricultural equipment and machinery, and cellar 
facilities. For example, farmworkers can provide part of the capital by purchasing part (or all) of 
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the farm with the governmental subsidy for land acquisition. They can also provide cash for the 
daily expenses of running the farm through loan arrangements with a bank, by utilizing the 
purchased farm as collateral. White farmers, on the other hand, can provide capital by donating 
part of their farms, providing agricultural equipment and machinery such as tractors, and/or 
granting the right to use cellar facilities on their farms. Profits accrued from the project will be 
divided between the farmer and farmworkers based on the ratio of share equity ownership.   
 
One of the earlier examples of such a scheme is Thandi (meaning “nurturing love” in isiXhosa) 
in Elgin, located in the north-eastern part of the Western Cape.25 The Thandi Project began in 
1996 as a land reform project which aimed to sell 200 hectares of land (known as the Lebanon 
Farm) owned by South African Forestry Company Limited (SAFCOL) and the De Rust Estate 
(which manages Paul Cluver Wines) to a group consisting of farmworkers and local residents. It 
was formulated as a joint venture between three entities (SAFCOL, De Rust, and Lebanon Farm 
Community Trust which consists of 147 households in total), with each owning a 33.3% stake 
in the project. SAFCOL contributed part of the land. De Rust contributed part of the land, 
agricultural machinery and management support. The Lebanon Farm Community Trust 
purchased part of the land with a land acquisition subsidy from the government. Lebanon Farm, 
which had been covered in forest, was cleared and cultivated. With further assistance from the 
provincial Department of Agriculture, members of the Lebanon Farm Community Trust planted 
apples and pears, which are grown widely in the area, and wine grapes. In 2000, a new project 
to produce wine from grapes harvested at Lebanon Farm and sell it under a new brand (Thandi 
Wine) was added in order to improve the overall profitability of the Thandi Project.  
 
Lebanon Farm and Thandi Wine are separate business entities, and two new farms (both partly 
owned by black people) joined the latter as suppliers of grapes and as shareholders.26 In 2003, 
Thandi Wine became the first wine brand in the world to obtain fair trade certification. Since 
then, tasting and cafeteria facilities were built for tourists on the Lebanon Farm where the 
Thandi Project started. Initially, Thandi Wine was produced in the cellar of the neighbouring De 
Rust Estate, but this task was later transferred to Vinfruco (a producer-wholesaler company) in 
Stellenbosch. Vinfruco also took up the responsibility of marketing Thandi Wine. The 
production and marketing of Thandi Wine was then taken over by The Company of Wine 
                                                   
25 The following discussion on Thandi is based on Hamman and Ewert (1999), Kruger (2008: Chap. 
6), SAWIT (2010b), the Thandi Wine website (http://www.thandiwines.com/, accessed on 2 
February 2012), and an interview with Mr. Vernon Henn, General Manager, Thandi Wine, 5 October 
2011, Elgin. 
26 The composition of shareholders of Thandi Wine is as follows: Lebanon Farm Community Trust 
owns 52%, newly-joined farm owners own 14%, and The Company of Wine People which had a 
management contract owns 34%. Thus, half of the dividends from the sales of wine are to be 
returned to the Lebanon Community Trust. 
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People, a successor company to Vinfruco. In late 2009, the management of Thandi Wine 
became independent from The Company of Wine People upon the termination of the contract 
between the two. 
 
In the 2000s, a new type of joint venture between farmers and farmworkers emerged. In this 
new case, farmworkers did not receive land acquisition grants from the government. Instead, 
some farmers decided to give part of their farm to the workers. One such example is Thokozani 
(meaning “celebration” in isiZulu and isiXhosa) in Wellington. It was initiated in 2006 by the 
Diemersfontein Wine Country Estate, which is run by the founding family of the giant retail 
chain Woolworths.27 According to Ms. Denise Stubbs, director of the Thokozani Project, it was 
born out of the desire of Mr. David Sonnenberg, a member of the founding family and current 
owner of the estate who does not have an heir to inherit his family business, to leave a lasting 
legacy. The Thokozani Project is a three-party joint venture: the Diemersfontein provided a 40% 
of share in the form of land, an invited black investment consortium contributed capital 
equivalent to a 30% share, and the remaining 30% share was to be distributed to the employees 
of the Diemersfontein who wished to participate in the project. For employees, Thokozani is 
essentially a kind of stock option system. A stock option system is a type of remuneration 
system where executive board members and employees of a company are allowed to purchase a 
company’s shares at a fixed price and to obtain profits by selling their shares when the stock 
price rises. All the employees who worked for the Diemersfontein for at least one year were 
given a certain amount of shares free of charge, depending on their position and length of 
service. In addition, all the employees who wished to participate in the project were asked to 
devote 2% of their monthly salary to the purchase of further shares. Ms. Stubbs emphasizes that 
this serves the purpose of developing a sense of responsibility among participating workers as 
co-shareholders. When the project began, only 35 workers participated. The number of 
participating workers increased to 75, half of all workers of the Diemersfontein, by October 
2011. 
 
The Thokozani Project consists of two businesses. One is the management of a conference 
centre which it took over from the Diemersfontein Estate. Thokozani borrowed money from a 
bank by using the land donated by the Diemersfontein as collateral and built new 
accommodations for conference participants. The other business is the development and sale of 
                                                   
27 The following discussion on Thokozani is based on SAWIT (2010b), the Thokozani website 
(http://www.thokozani.co.za/, accessed on 12 February 2012), and an interview with Ms. Denis 
Stubbs, Director, Thokozani, 5 October 2011, Wellington. It should be noted that Thokozani had 
originally applied to the Department of Land Affairs to receive a land acquisition grant in order to 
purchase a piece of land near Diemersfontein. However, its application was unsuccessful due to lack 
of funds in the Department. 
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Thokozani brand wine. Thokozani wine is made in the Diemersfontein cellar through a contract 
agreement between the two. While most of the Diemersfontein brand wine is made of single 
varietals, Thokozani concentrates on developing and selling blended wine. The Diemersfontein 
Estate continues to bear most of the running cost of Thokozani, including the salaries of 
workers who have joined the project.  
 
Another example of a joint venture in which the interests of the farmer and farmworkers are 
integrated further is the Solms-Delta Wine Estate in Franschhoek.28 Originally, the Estate 
consisted of three farms. Two people who each bought one farm decided to purchase a third 
farm by utilizing their two purchased farms as collateral, and they gave the third farm to a group 
of farmworkers and residents.29 In this way, a framework was created for a joint venture in 
which each of the three entities (two farm owners and one trust of farmworkers and residents) 
owned 33.3% of the Estate. One of the owners initiated archaeological and historical research 
on the Estate and then decided to exhibit the findings in a small museum on the premises. The 
exhibition in the museum not only tells us the names of historical owners of the Estate, but also 
those of farmworkers and slaves who worked and died there. According to the Estate manager, 
acknowledging the contributions of these farmworkers and slaves in the historical development 
of the Estate led the two farm owners to decide to give one-third of the ownership of the Estate 
to farmworkers and residents. The Estate has chosen not to create a special BEE brand, but the 
three owners share profits from sales of the Solms-Delta brand wine. 
 
One common feature of these joint ventures is that the farmers usually take the initiative in 
forming such a venture with farmworkers. Even in cases like Thandi where farmworkers decide 
to buy land with the governmental land acquisition subsidy, it is often the farm owner who 
proposes a share equity scheme with the farmworkers. Due to this, some researchers criticise 
this kind of land reform as a mere attempt by the white farmer to gain investment in his or her 
farm by utilizing the governmental grant (Mayson 2003: 12). Others question whether the share 
equity scheme can bring tangible benefits to farmworkers (Du Toit et al. 2008: 24-25). There 
are few cases where a dividend from the scheme is paid out regularly to shareholders. This is 
because the sales proceeds from grapes and wine are usually either reinvested in the farm or 
used to repay a loan. It took seven years before the first dividend was paid to shareholders of the 
Lebanon Farm. Thandi Wine managed to sell well in the export market right from the beginning, 
thanks to its fair trade certification. This enabled it to pay dividends on a regular basis until the 
                                                   
28  The following discussion on Solms-Delta is based on the Solms-Delta website 
(http://www.solms-delta.co.za/, accessed on 2 February 2012) and an interview with Mr. Craig 
MacGillivray, CEO, Solms-Delta Wine Estate, 4 October 2011, Franschhoek. 
29 As of October 2011, the Solms-Delta Estate employs 140 people, and 220 people reside on the 
estate. Not all residents are employed by the estate, nor do all employees live on the estate. 
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global financial crisis in 2008. Nonetheless, due to the large number of shareholders in the 
Thandi Project, the amount of the dividend received by each farmworker household was 
paltry.30 Moreover, Derman et al. (2010) is sceptical about the level of understanding of the 
share equity scheme among the local community members and farmworkers, as it tends to entail 
complex arrangements and each scheme has different components and structures.  
 
However, it is also true that a joint venture has several benefits for farmworkers. Firstly, the 
initial capital investment requirement is relatively cheap, as the venture can use agricultural 
machinery and cellar facilities belonging to the farmer. In some cases, farmers bear the majority 
of the operational costs. As mentioned above, the Diemersfontein pays the salary of Thokozani 
employees, and in Solms-Delta, two farm owners bear the daily running costs of the business. 
Secondly, farmworkers can also rely on the existing networks and experience of the farmer in 
both ensuring the quality of wine production and the development of marketing strategies for 
their wine brand. The success story of Thandi Wine in the export market hinged on its obtaining 
fair trade certification. The idea of getting fair trade certificate in fact was the brainchild of the 
owner of the De Rust Estate (Kruger 2008: 90-91). 
 
The meaningful participation of farmworkers in the management of the project is a key issue in 
determining whether a joint venture is effective as a farmworker empowerment model. It is true 
that the number of joint ventures in the wine industry has increased since the 2000s. Still, taking 
the industry as a whole, white farmers who sold or gave part of their farm or wine business to 
their farmworkers are still in the minority.31 In this context, farmers who started a joint venture 
with farmworkers can be called “progressive” ones. In the De Rust and the Solms-Delta Estates, 
farmers also have made conscious and active efforts to improve the general living conditions of 
workers, such as by providing decent housing to farmworkers and better educational 
opportunities to farmworkers’ children. However, if the long-term objective of a joint venture 
lies in promoting and integrating black people into management positions, achievements so far 
in this regard are not very promising. It is rare for farmworkers to get involved in the 
management side of a project. In Thokozani and Thandi, black managers are hired from outside 
the local farmworkers’ community. These black managers play dual roles as representatives of 
BEE wine brands, and as personnel managers who act as bridges between farmers and workers.  
 
The trust relationship between the farmer and farmworkers is constantly tested in managing a 
                                                   
30 Interview with Mr. Vernon Henn, General Manager, Thandi Wine, 5 October 2011, Elgin. 
31 Interviews with Mr. Johan Giliomee, Manager, BEE Advisory Service, VinPro, 26 September 
2011, Paarl, and Mr. Henry Petersen, Manager of BEE Programmes and Master Mentorship, WIDA, 
17 September 2010, Paarl. 
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joint venture. This can gravely affect the continuity of the project. There is at least one known 
case in Stellenbosch where the dispute over the distribution of proceeds from sales of wine 
caused the dissolution of a joint venture between the farmer and farmworkers. In this project, 
workers decided to manage the business of growing grapes and producing and selling wine on 
their own. This meant that they had to bear all the costs of business operations. However, they 
quickly encountered difficulty in repaying a loan from a bank that they had obtained when they 
had bought the farm in the first place. In the end, the workers were forced to sell their farm in 
order to repay debt.32 As mentioned above, Thandi Wine can be considered one of the few 
cases of a successful BEE project in the wine industry in terms of international recognition and 
annual turnover. Recently, Thandi decided to reduce dependence on white business entities such 
as the De Rust Estate and The Company of Wine People and to increase its managerial 
independence. Although its state of business as a joint venture between white business entities 
and black farmworkers has not been altered, the future development of Thandi Wine should be 
closely watched in order to evaluate the success and sustainability of BEE wineries.  
 
Most of the landed BEE wineries are joint ventures, but there is an exceptional case where a 
black family bought a farm and began to produce and sell their own wine brand. M’hudi 
(meaning “harvester” in seTswana) Wine in Stellenbosch is managed by an African family who 
bought this farm of 23 hectares in 2002.33 The middle-aged couple who bought the farm used to 
work as professionals in city. For them, purchasing a farm was a realization of the “dream” that 
they had harboured for many years. Being amateurs in both viticulture and wine production, 
they have learned the theoretical aspects of managing a vineyard and wine business on the 
Internet. They have learned the practical knowledge and skills concerning viticulture from 
farmworkers. The neighbouring white family who managed the Villiera Estate taught them the 
essentials of the wine business including making, storing, selling and marketing wine. Thanks to 
the contact M’hudi obtained through an introduction by the Villiera Estate, it began to supply 
wine to Marks & Spencer, one of the leading supermarket chains in the UK, in 2007. The case 
of M’hudi shows the importance of the white farmers’ network and their technical and 
managerial assistance for new black entrants in the wine industry, even though they do not 
become partners in a joint venture officially. 
 
Non-landed Entry: Wine Brand Companies 
The second type of BEE winery is a wine brand company. It buys wine from cellars (in most 
                                                   
32 After the farm was sold in 2010, each worker who owned a share in the farm received 5,000 rand 
in cash. (Interview with Ms. Veronica Campher, Boland trustee, 27 September 2011, Somerset West). 
33  The following discussion on M’hudi is based on SAWIT (2010b), the M’hudi website 
(http://www.mhudi.com/, accessed on 3 February 2012), and an interview with Ms. Malmesey 
Rangaka, CEO, M’hudi Wine, 26 September 2011, Stellenbosch. 
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cases from producer cellars) and sells it as its own brand wine. Most black wine brand 
companies are micro-enterprises with 1 or 2 persons working as a CEO or general manager. 
They contract out most of the actual wine production processes (including crushing the grapes, 
fermentation, blending, maturing and bottling) to cellars. Wine brand companies are probably 
classified as wine merchants in the industry statistics of the South African Wine Industry 
Information and System (SAWIS). However, as most black wine brand companies are operating 
on a very small scale, it is not certain whether they are all captured by the SAWIS statistics. In 
mid-2010, there were 50 BEE wineries on a list compiled by the Wine Industry Development 
Association (WIDA) that provides agricultural extension and management supports to BEE 
wineries. Amongst the 50 BEE wineries on the list, 16 owned both land and wine brands (i.e., 
the first type of BEE winery discussed above), while 34 only owned wine brands, i.e., wine 
brand companies. Thus it seems that the latter form of entry into the wine industry is more 
popular among black people.34 
 
The financial barrier to starting a wine brand company is relatively low, given that one does not 
need to own assets such as land and a cellar. At the same time, as most wine brand companies 
do not get involved in the actual wine production process, they are often quick to exit from the 
business. In fact, several wine brand companies on the WIDA list are already out of business. 
One example is Lindiwe (meaning “the person we have been waiting for” in isiZulu) Wine 
established in 2003. It was the first black wine brand company and received a 3 million rand 
grant from the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) upon the launch of the company. The 
industry magazine (WineLand) ran a feature article about it as a “breakthrough empowerment 
wine” in 2005 (Du Plessis 2005).35 Thus, the early days of the company seemed to be filled 
with good fortune and the blessing of the industry. However, neither the fortune nor the 
operation of Lindiwe Wine lasted long. After launching several wines under the Lindiwe brand, 
it encountered difficulty in securing money to finance its operational cost. By the fifth year, it 
was forced to stop producing new vintages. According to the Lindiwe Wine’s former sales 
manager, the NEF grant had to be spent within a single fiscal year, and they had difficulty in 
securing cash for their second year of operation. This implies that receiving a large grant with 
strict conditions on how to use it might have distorted the possibility of sound business 
                                                   
34 This list was compiled by Mr. Henry Peterson who is in charge of BEE projects at WIDA. I 
obtained it from him in September 2010. Mr. Peterson emphasized that this list is not exhaustive and 
should not be understood as containing all the BEE wineries in the wine industry. 
35 The founder of Lindiwe Wine was Mr. Nosey Pieterse who has been a representative of BAWSI 
which advocates for improvement in the rights of farmworkers in the Western Cape. He claims to be 
the inventor of the idea of a “virtual wine company” (wine brand company) which does not own 
cellar facilities. BAWSI is known as a radical group among civil society organisations working in 
the wine industry. Mr. Pieterse formerly served as a councillor in local government and is still 
actively involved in local politics. 
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development for Lindiwe Wine.36 
 
There are of course black wine brand companies established in the mid-2000s that continue to 
operate today. These include Women in Wine, African Roots Wine, Ses'Fikile (meaning “we 
came in our own style” in isiXhosa) Wine, Re’Mogo (meaning “stand together” in seTswana) 
Wine and so on. One common feature of the founding members of these early black wine brand 
companies is that they had little knowledge or experience in wine production or corporate 
management. In most cases, their prior professional training and experience were not related to 
growing grapes or producing wine. Their previous job experiences included civil servant, 
teacher, employee of an alcoholic beverage company, NGO staff and so forth. Some of them did 
not even drink wine before they started their own wine brand company. 
 
Certainly, the fact that the wine industry is a major industry in the Western Cape must have 
affected their decision to enter into this industry. In addition, it is arguable that their motivation 
to join the industry without prior knowledge or experience could be related to the gap between 
the glamorous image that the wine industry is trying to sell to general public and their own bitter 
memories of alcoholism in their families. One of the founding members of the Ses’Fikile Wine 
explains her motivation to start a wine brand company in the following way: 
 
(The reason I decided to start a wine brand company is that) I was interested in the 
contradictions of wine. In my house in the township where I grew up, when my 
brother drank wine and got drunk, he always caused havoc. Therefore I hated wine. 
However, in the media, wine has always been portrayed as an elegant and 
sophisticated drink. I always wondered, “Why such a difference?”37   
 
Another feature is that a number of black wine brand companies have tried to sell their products 
by giving a story to their wine brand. For instance, Ses’Fikile Wine emphasizes that it was 
established by four black women who grew up in townships (Gugulethu and Khayelitsha) in 
Cape Town.38 Seven Sisters wine brand sold by the African Roots Wine is named after the 
seven sisters who ran the company. The flavour and character of each wine under the Seven 
Sisters brand is associated with the character of one of the seven sisters. On the wine bottle’s 
back label, one can also read a short story about a small fishing village on the coast of the 
                                                   
36 Interview with Ms. Elizabeth Petersen, former managing director of Lindiwe Wine (currently 
CEO of Libby’s Pride Wine), 3 October 2011, Stellenbosch. 
37 Interview with Ms. Nondomiso Pikashe, Director, Ses’Fikile Wine, 29 September 2011, 
Gugulethu. 
38 Interview with Ms. Nondomiso Pikashe, Director, Ses’Fikile Wine, 29 September 2011, 
Gugulethu. 
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Western Cape where the seven sisters grew up.39 It is obvious from its name that Women in 
Wine tries to appeal to its customers as a company run by women.40 
 
For black wine brand companies, it is of great importance to build a good relationship with 
cellars which supply wine for them, but this is not always easy. Ses’Fikile Wine was originally 
established as a joint venture between four black women and a cellar. When the cellar was 
acquired by an American company that was not interested in continuing such a venture, 
Ses’Fikile Wine literally lost its supplier of wine. As a result, Ses’Fikile Wine had to be closed 
down after a few years of seemingly successful operation. In 2009, one of the founding 
members of Ses’Fikile Wine decided to revive the company under the same name. However, 
according to her, it was not easy at all to find a cellar that was willing to sell wine to her new 
company.41 A similar experience was narrated to the author by Re’Mogo Wine, which failed to 
secure wine supply agreements with at least two cellars before it finally signed a contract with 
its current supplier.42 
 
Tensions between black wine brand companies and cellars ultimately arise over the simple 
question of to what extent the former wish to have a say in the wine production process and to 
maintain the independence of their businesses. SAWIT (2010a: 10-11) points out that the 
problem of black wine brand companies is their lack of influence and involvement in product 
decisions on the type and style of wine. SAWIT further states that some cellars take advantage 
of this weakness and try to sell poor quality wine to black wine brand companies. It is not easy 
for black wine brand companies to establish a strong bargaining positions vis-à-vis cellars. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as they do not have their own cellar facility, they 
have to contract out wine production to a cellar. This means that they cannot be involved 
directly in the production process of the commodity that they are selling, even though it is their 
own wine brand. Secondly, existing cellars are largely still dominated by white interests. 
Therefore, the fact that they are new black entrants in itself may work to their disadvantage. 
Thirdly, since they are small and micro-enterprises, the total amount of wine they can purchase 
is also small, and thus they cannot become an important customer for cellar.  
 
There are black wine brand companies that differ slightly from those that entered the wine 
                                                   
39 The Seven Sisters website (http://www.sevensisters.co.za/wmenu.php, accessed on 10 February 
2012). 
40 Interview with Ms. Beverly Farmer, Managing Director, Women in Wine, 27 September 2011, 
Somerset West. 
41 Interview with Ms. Nondomiso Pikashe, Director, Ses’Fikile Wine, 29 September 2011, 
Gugulethu. 
42 Interview with Mr. Thamsanqa Hombana and Mr. Theo Sidzumo, Re’mogo Holdings, 3 October 
2011, Kayamnandi. 
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industry in the mid-2000s. The first type of such a company has embarked upon selling a wine 
brand as a new development of an existing enterprise. One such example is Mzoli’s Wine, 
owned by a prominent businessman who owns a butchery and restaurant business in the 
Gugulethu Township and a real estate business. He launched Mzoli’s Wine in 2000 in order to 
combine wine business with his restaurant business. Another example is Le Ric Mal Wine run 
by the Green family who manages a bottle recycling business. According to Mr. Green, it was 
launched in 2008 in order to expand their family business into a new phase.43 The second type 
is a company initiated by black people who have some experiences in the industry, such as 
Howard Booysen Wine and Libby's Pride Wine. The founder of Howard Booysen Wine studied 
oenology at the Elsenburg College of Agriculture (which was renamed on 1 April 2004 to the 
Cape Institute for Agricultural Training: Elsenburg) in the Western Cape. He was chosen as the 
first trainee of the Cape Winemakers Guild (an exclusive professional organisation of 
winemakers), which gave him an opportunity to study further the art of wine making in various 
cellars for three years. The job of winemaker is a professional occupation, and winemakers are 
usually employed by a cellar. Mr. Booysen chose to produce his own wine brand rather than 
work for a cellar.44 Libby’s Pride Wine was founded by a former sales manager of Lindiwe 
Wine in 2010.45 Both are relatively new to the industry as they began selling their brand wine in 
2009-2010. Thus, it is too early to determine whether they can develop their wine business 
differently from their earlier counterparts. 
 
Competition among BEE Wineries and Challenges of Expanding Markets 
The two types of BEE wineries discussed above (those with or without land) are competing with 
each other over market share, which can lead to conflicts between them and prevent them from 
forging a united front as BEE wineries in the industry. In the final part of this paper, I would 
like to touch upon the issue of competition among BEE wineries and the possibility of 
expanding markets for their wine. 
 
Regardless of its status as a share equity scheme or as a wine brand company, most BEE 
wineries aim at the export market. There are at least three reasons for this. To begin with, it is 
difficult for any new company to enter the domestic wine market where large corporations have 
a monopolizing presence. The Distell and KWV are said to have a market share over 70% in the 
domestic wine market. There are also many established estate wine brands. Secondly, one 
cannot deny that many people in South Africa, regardless of race, maintain a deeply rooted 
                                                   
43 Interviews with Mr. Mzoli Ngcawuzele, CEO, Mzoli Properties, 6 October 2011, Gugulethu, and 
Mr. Malcolm Green, Le Ric Mal Wine, 29 September 2011, Brackenfell. 
44 Interview with Mr. Howard Booysen, Howard Booysen Wine, 29 September 2011, Stellenbosch. 
45 Interview with Ms. Elizabeth Petersen, CEO, Libby’s Pride Wine, 3 October 2011, Stellenbosch. 
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prejudice against BEE wine as being inferior in quality. Some white wine drinkers are not keen 
to purchase wine whose brand name is in a local African language which they probably cannot 
pronounce accurately.46 The expanding black middle and upper classes, often referred to as 
“Black Diamond”, are not big supporters of BEE wine, either. According to an owner of the 
first boutique wine shop in the Soweto township who is also a co-founder of the annual Soweto 
Wine Festival,47 his customers (mostly successful black businessmen) prefer the existing 
well-known brand wine and are not interested in BEE brands.48 Thirdly, several types of 
financial assistance are available for BEE companies to develop export markets, such as travel 
subsidies for participation in the international trade fair.49 Due to the heightened competition 
among wine producing countries and different wine brands in the international wine market 
(Anderson ed. 2004), mere participation in the trade fair does not guarantee them a buyer. Still, 
the existence of an ethical market such as a fair trade adds attraction to the export market for 
BEE wineries. 
 
Apart from Thandi Wine which was able to increase its sales in the export market thanks to the 
fair trade certification, the profitability of BEE wineries has remained low or even in the red. 
SAWIT (2010a) attributes the BEE wineries’ failure to make a profit to the fact that most of 
them do not have a clear marketing strategy nor do they understand the differences in the wine 
market of each country. 50  BEE wineries that can count on considerable support from 
white-owned estates, such as Thokozani and Solms-Delta, will probably be able to survive even 
if profit from the sales of wine remains low over the medium to long term. Black wine 
companies can also survive if they have already been successful in other areas of business, as is 
the case with Mzoli’s Wine or Le Rick Mal Wine. However, most black brand companies 
operating as micro or small businesses cannot afford to wait for the medium- and long-term 
returns. 
 
The competition over market share has also become a cause of tension and conflict among BEE 
wineries. In particular, black wine brand companies and share equity schemes began to quarrel 
over who the legitimate beneficiaries of BEE are. The former argue that, being rich in 
entrepreneurial spirit, they should serve as the model for BEE. The latter claim that they are the 
                                                   
46 Ms. Elizabeth Petersen of Libby’s Pride Wine told me that she was advised by a domestic retailer 
not to use an African language for the name of her wine brand. 
47 Soweto Wine Festival is an annual wine festival held in Soweto in September every year since 
2005 in order to develop and cultivate the market for wine consumption among black people. 
48 Interview with Mr. Mnikelo Mngciphu, Morara Wine Store, 22 September 2011, Soweto. 
49 WOSA is allocated a special budget to support BEE enterprises and projects in the wine industry. 
In addition, WESGRO, a public-private partnership organisation in the Western Cape, also provides 
travel expenses to wineries that participate in international trade shows. 
50 This point has also been noted by Mr. Henry Petersen of WIDA. 
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genuine model of BEE, as their purpose is to empower farmworkers who historically have been 
the most marginalised in the industry, and the number of people who benefit from the schemes 
is higher.51 They fight over the allocation of the BEE promotion budget assigned to WOSA. 
However, given that level of black entry into the industry as a whole, while increasing, remains 
low, I would argue that the dichotomous thinking of farmworkers and black entrepreneurs is not 
constructive. Farmworkers require further assistance in order to realize meaningful participation 
in management of share equity schemes. The profitability and sustainability of black wine brand 
companies are precarious. In a previous section, I mentioned that the implementation of the 
Wine Charter was stalled due to the mounting conflict between farmworkers and their 
employers (white farmers). The problem of competition among BEE wineries shows that it is 
difficult to agree on the form and the means of empowerment even among those who are 
supposedly targets of BEE policy. 
 
Some of the earlier black wine brand companies that entered the wine industry in the mid-2000s 
began to look for new opportunities. Having witnessed the demise of several similar companies 
which have gone out of business, they are alarmed about the sustainability of their own 
enterprises. In circumstances where the prospect of acquiring land was limited, starting a wine 
brand company was a shortcut to enter the industry for black people. However, it gradually 
became clear that lack of essential assets such as a vineyard and/or a cellar was a great 
disadvantage to them when selling wine. Consequently, many of them are now wishing to 
acquire a vineyard. Their aspirations are reasonable, if not easily realizable. They have learned 
that it is very important to show a farm as the source of the grapes for their wine to foreign 
importers.52 The success of Thandi Wine has made them also think of obtaining fair trade 
certification. They need to be able to identify the source of the grapes for their wine in order to 
obtain such certification. By owning a vineyard and sourcing grapes from it, they can satisfy 
this condition.53 
 
Last but not least, it is arguable that an alternative way for BEE wineries to avoid fierce 
competition with large corporations and well-known brands may be to target the domestic niche 
                                                   
51 Based on interviews with several managers of share equity schemes and entrepreneurs of wine 
brand companies in September and October 2011 in the Western Cape. 
52 The following statement by Ms. Petersen of Libby’s Pride Wine to the author captures the 
difficulty faced by wine brand companies: “I am tired of having business meetings with potential 
buyers from overseas in coffee shops.” 
53 Among the wine brand companies mentioned in this paper, African Roots Wine recently acquired 
a vineyard in Stellenbosch. I was not able to visit the farm during my fieldwork during September 
and October 2011 as the building on the farm was still under construction. Therefore, detailed 
information on how it acquired the farm is not known to the author. 
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market.54 Some black wine brand companies have already taken this route. Mzoli’s Wine has so 
far concentrated on shebeens (bars) and taverns in townships which constitute an important 
domestic niche market. 55  Ses’Fikile Wine and Re’Mogo Wine, whose founders live in 
townships, are also eyeing these popular local bars and taverns. M’hudi Wine, Le Rick Mal 
Wine, Libby’s Pride Wine and Howard Booysen Wine already have some business relationships 
with domestic retailers (i.e., supermarkets and restaurants). Their marketing strategies are not 
exclusively targeting the export market, but instead they are trying to find a way to penetrate the 
domestic market. At the moment, the presence of BEE wineries in the South African wine 
industry is still negligible. However, in the near future, it might be possible to find a BEE 
winery that has established a presence in the domestic market and become a representative BEE 
wine brand in the international market. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper discussed different forms of black entry into the agricultural sector through a case 
study of the wine industry in the Western Cape. Particular attention was paid to the relationship 
between specific forms of black entry and the goals of BEE policy in South Africa. This paper 
further examined the transformation of the wine industry after democratization and the attendant 
changes in the external environment surrounding black entry. Since democratization and market 
liberalization, the South African wine industry has transformed itself into a fast-growing export 
industry. At the same time, it is clear that the concentration of grape production at fewer 
relatively large-scale producers has progressed. In conclusion, I would like to point out three 
direct and indirect influences imposed by the changes in the wine industry and the development 
of the BEE policy on the forms of black entry and empowerment. 
 
Firstly, it seems that the growth of the wine industry into a leading export industry after 
liberalization has prompted new entry into the industry regardless of race. If the wine industry 
had remained as it was, mainly targeting the small domestic market of white population, those 
without prior knowledge or experience would never have been motivated to join it. The 
emergence of a new international market thanks to democratization and liberalization, together 
                                                   
54 Mather (2005) argues that the expansion of the market into the niche area, such as independent 
shops and restaurants, has vital importance for small- and medium-scale companies in the 
agricultural processing industry in South Africa, where major supermarket chains have 
well-developed supplier networks. 
55 The owner of Mzoli’s Wine organised the Gugulethu Wine Festival in 2011 in order to develop 
the wine consumption market among black residents in Cape Town. Forty wineries participated in 
the festival, and 10,000 people are said to have visited the event over two days. The owner of 
Mzoli’s Wine is planning to make this an annual event. 
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with the rebirth of the wine industry in the Western Cape as a glamorous and attractive leading 
industry, motivated black entrepreneurs to start a new type of business, i.e., the black wine 
brand company. For producer cellars that have been the main producers of wine in South Africa, 
the increase in the number of smaller private cellars meant increased competition over market 
share. For them, black merchants (wine brand companies) became new potential clients or 
business partners. 
 
Secondly, market liberalization also created a new tendency towards focusing on quality rather 
than quantity in the South African wine industry. This in turn led to the development of a new 
business model where one not only engages in grape production, but also creates and sells one’s 
own wine brand. Since consumers tend to associate the quality of wine with a grape varietal 
and/or brand name, the creation of one’s own wine brand became an important marketing 
strategy in the South African wine industry. Therefore, most of the share equity schemes 
initiated as a land reform project in the wine industry were going to have both grape production 
and the creation of a wine brand as important components. Amid the progress in the 
concentration of grape production together with the concomitant decrease of relatively 
small-scale producers in the liberalized market, it is becoming more and more necessary to 
combine grape production and wine production in order to maintain the sustainability of the 
enterprise. 
 
Thirdly, in spite of the fact that policy intervention to realize BEE by the government is 
relatively weak in the agricultural sector compared to the mining or fishing industries, the 
degree of black ownership and business participation in the hitherto white-dominated wine 
industry has been increasing, albeit at a snail’s pace. In particular, after the enactment of the 
BBBEE Act in 2003, large corporations such as Distell and KWV sold part of their shares to a 
black investors’ consortium. This means that the form of BEE promoted by the government, i.e., 
BEE deals by large companies, is also taking place in the wine industry. In addition, the number 
of share equity schemes by “progressive” white farmers has increased, and diversification has 
been seen in the backgrounds of black entrepreneurs who run wine brand companies. As 
discussed in the second section, when the AgriBEE Charter becomes a sector code under 
Section 9 of the BBBEE Act, pressure on farmers to start a share equity scheme will increase.   
 
Some researchers have criticized the BEE policy for having become a tool for ANC politicians 
and their relatives to enrich themselves, even though the policy presents itself as catering to a 
“broad-based” population (Southall 2007, Marais 2011: 140-144). This paper does not deny that 
BEE has such an aspect, but it also has demonstrated existence of various forms of black entry 
into the wine industry which are not limited to BEE deals by large corporations. At the moment, 
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most black entry into the wine industry happens through people who are actually involved in 
projects such as a share equity scheme or a wine brand company rather than through BEE deals. 
This paper has paid particular attention to wine brand companies and has pointed out the 
problem of their sustainability. While wine brand companies served as a shortcut for black 
people to enter the wine industry in a situation where the possibility of acquiring land was 
limited, it turned out to be difficult to stay in business. Although wine brand companies receive 
financial assistance for their marketing activities to promote exports, they are not direct 
beneficiaries of the BEE policy, whose emphasis is on the scorecard. The experiences of wine 
brand companies seem to support the critiques of the BEE policy which argue that the policy 
hampers the development of small enterprises as it encourages the black elites’ tendency to 
become managers or employees at large companies rather than entrepreneurs (Gelb 2010 : 
51-57). If the government wants to realise meaningful black entry into the economic sphere and 
black empowerment in the wider sense rather than in the narrowly defined sense of black 
ownership of shares in large corporations, this paper argues that there needs to be a directional 
change in the BEE policy towards more focused support for the development of small 
enterprises. 
 
Another implication from this case study of the wine industry for the realization of BEE in 
South Africa concerns the extent to which the implementation of the BEE policy should be 
entrusted to the initiative of industry players. This paper discussed the difficulty of the Wine 
Charter drafting and implementation process. While the wine industry succeeded in bringing 
together the four principal actors in the industry (grape producers, cellars, farmworkers and 
marketing agents) and in drafting the Wine Charter prior to the AgriBEE Charter, its 
implementation was stalled due to the mounting conflict between white farmers and black 
farmworkers. Unless the power relations within the industry change, intervention from an 
outside organization such as the Department of Agriculture will be necessary in order to realize 
BEE. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that an increase in political intervention 
also carries the risk of BEE being used as a means of political patronage, as in the case of the 
mining sector. 
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